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The Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework Act 2003 (Act 41 of 2003),1 intended 
to resolve the hiatus in the 1996 Constitution with 
respect to the role of traditional leadership, has 
imploded in a welter of inconclusive legislation, more 
especially because its implications in terms of land 
rights and judicial authority have proved unacceptable 
to both rural communities and the Constitutional 
Court. However, the judicial debates around the 
Communal Land Rights Act2 at least did manage 
to produce consensus with regard to the validity of 
‘living customary law’, as opposed to the discarded 
and discredited colonial version sometimes referred 
to as ‘official customary law’.3 
One facet of the Framework Act that has hitherto 
escaped attention is its attempt to regulate the 
institution of traditional leadership by defining the 
categories of traditional leadership; more precisely, 
identifying the traditional leadership positions to 
be recognised, and settling disputes between rival 
claimants to specific positions. In former years, such 
decisions had been taken by the Department of 
Bantu Affairs or the homeland administrations, but 
the demise of the old order left this particular loose 
end unattended, leaving government in areas such 
as Sekhukhuneland paralysed by rivalry between 
competing factions. In addition, discrepancies in the 
jurisdictions – and the pay slips – of the traditional 
leaders in different provinces urgently needed to be 
addressed, with 11 recognised paramount chiefs 
of other provinces aspiring to the privileges and 
perquisites of the Zulu king.
It was, moreover, common cause in government 
circles that the institution of traditional leadership had 
been tainted by its association with colonialism and 
apartheid; that many legitimate traditional leaders had 
been deposed in favour of compliant stooges; and 
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that the very kingships themselves, such as that of 
Matanzima in Western Thembuland, required further 
scrutiny. Since the entire thrust of President Thabo 
Mbeki’s policy, as reflected in the Framework Act, 
was to empower traditional leaders and augment 
their authority, it was deemed necessary to ‘cleanse’ 
the institution of its colonial accretions so as to 
officially recognise traditional leaders as shining lights 
of pre-colonial African democracy.
In Chapter 6 of the Framework Act, this cleansing 
function was assigned to a Commission on 
Traditional Leadership: Disputes and Claims, usually 
referred to as the Nhlapo Commission after Professor 
Thandabantu Nhlapo, its first chairperson. Twelve 
commissioners were appointed on the basis of 
being ‘knowledgeable regarding customs and the 
institution of traditional leadership’. The judicial status 
of this Commission rendered it entirely independent 
of government, in line with the thinking of Section 
5.10 of the White Paper,4 which had noted the 
tendency of former commissions to be influenced by 
vested interests. The National House of Traditional 
Leaders, which would have much preferred to settle 
all traditional disputes according to its own discretion, 
regarded the Commission with deep suspicion, and 
there was a general perception that Mbeki had set 
it up to serve his own purposes while preserving the 
fiction of deniability, which was such a hallmark of his 
political style.
Although Section 5.10 of the White Paper noted that 
‘the customary law of African communities was 
characterized by a lack of effective mechanisms to 
deal with claims and dispute resolution’,5 Section 
25(3) of the Framework Act nevertheless instructed 
the Commission to ‘consider and apply customary 
law and the customs of relevant traditional 
communities’ and to be ‘guided by … customary 
norms and criteria’.6 ‘Custom’ was never defined in 
the Framework Act, and ‘customary institution or 
structure’ was defined merely as ‘institutions or 
structures established in terms of customary law’, 
a solipsistical pronouncement of classic proportions. 
The problem of applying ‘customary law’ to 
historical events was left to the commissioners to 
work out for themselves.
It has to be said that the Commission was singularly 
ill equipped to meet this challenge, although 
Nhlapo had been chair of the Project Committee 
on Customary Law at the South African Law 
Commission. Of the 11 other commissioners, six 
specialised in law, three in language and culture, 
one in education and one (myself) in history.7 
Besides myself, the only person attached to 
the Commission who had any background in 
politics, sociology or anthropology was Welile 
Khuzwayo, an anthropologist seconded from the 
National Department of Traditional Affairs, who, 
being a seconded official, was excluded from the 
deliberations of the Commission. 
Two kingdoms of the same lineage?
This article will concentrate on one specific category 
of the Commission’s cases, where the kingships 
called into question dated back to the pre-colonial 
period or the period where any kind of colonial 
intervention was demonstrably absent. The case 
of Western Mpondoland goes back to the 1840s, 
a full 50 years before the colonial annexation of 
Mpondoland in 1894. The case of the Transvaal 
Ndebele goes as far back as the early 17th century, 
long before Jan van Riebeeck first set foot on 
African soil. I will argue that customary law is 
entirely inappropriate in such cases, and that the 
Commission’s determinations in this respect are 
utterly invalid and lacking all foundation.    
Western Mpondoland
The Western Mpondo claim to kingship dates back 
to the reign of the great King Faku (c. 1815–1867). 
Faku’s original Great Place was located at Qawukeni 
east of the Mzimvubu River, but following two Zulu 
invasions in the 1820s he was driven back to the 
Mngazi River, which is west of the Mzimvubu. After 
the Zulu threat had subsided, Faku returned to 
Qawukeni but some time in the 1840s, his Right-
Hand Son Ndamase again crossed the Mzimvubu 
to establish – as far as the claimants are concerned 
– the kingdom of Western Mpondoland. According to 
Chief Victor Poto, Ndamase’s great-grandson:8  
One morning, when Faku had gone out with his 
shield-bearer, he emerged from the bush to see 
someone lurking around the small calf-kraal. When 
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he realised that it was Ndamase, he called him and 
asked where he had come from. Before Ndamase 
could explain, Faku said ‘Yes, my boy, I am aware 
that you will be killing me.’ With that they went 
inside the house, and Faku advised Ndamase 
to leave Qawukeni, saying this would have to be 
done because Ndamase’s people were clashing 
with those of the Great Place, and this would 
become even worse because Mqikela (Faku’s heir 
in the Great House) was just approaching the age 
of manhood.
Ndamase left with his people; men, women and 
children, taking all their possessions and burning their 
houses on the eastern side. Faku went with him to 
make sure he never came back. When they got to the 
Mzimvubu River, Faku said that each of them should 
keep to his own side, and he granted Ndamase 
authority over all the minor Mpondo chiefdoms who 
were already living to the west of the river.  
The essence of the above oral tradition is amply 
confirmed by independent sources. Ndamase was a 
renowned warrior who had led the Mpondo armies 
against the Zulu regiments. Although junior in rank 
as the son of the Right-Hand Wife, Ndamase would 
always be a threat to Mqikela, his much younger 
brother of the Great House, and was therefore 
encouraged to exercise his undoubted talents 
elsewhere. Ndamase ruled Western Mpondoland for 
about 30 years, subjugating his cousins, defeating his 
neighbours and greatly expanding Mpondo territory. 
It would be fair to say that the Kingdom of Western 
Mpondoland was more the creation of Ndamase than 
the gift of Faku.      
When Mpondoland was annexed by the imperial 
power in 1894, two treaties were made on two 
different days in two different places, one with 
Eastern Mpondoland and the other with Western 
Mpondoland, and each of the two kings was 
recognised as a ‘Paramount Chief’.9 Nevertheless, 
a strong case can be made – and the Great House 
of Eastern Mpondoland did make it – that only one 
king should have been recognised. The case rests 
on the fact that, when Ndamase died in 1876, the 
Great House of Mqikela asserted that the authority 
conceded by Faku had been entrusted to 
Ndamase on a personal basis only, and that this 
authority had automatically expired with Ndamase’s 
death. Upon which, Nqwiliso, Ndamase’s heir – 
shameful to relate – obtained colonial recognition of 
his kingship by literally selling his territory of Port St 
Johns to the intruder.10  
Two years after Faku’s death, the Governor, Sir 
Philip Wodehouse applied personally to Ndamase 
for the cession of the Port and was met by a 
distinct refusal ... In 1878 renewed efforts were 
made by the Government, and Ndamase’s son, 
Nqwiliso, was more easily persuaded than his 
father.  An agreement was made with him through 
Major Elliot, the Chief Magistrate at Umtata, 
whereby the chief ceded to the Cape Colony all 
the sovereign rights which he then possessed over 
the water and navigation of the Umzimvubu … He 
was in recognition of this, to be acknowledged as 
independent of Mqikela, from whose attacks he 
was promised protection, so long as he maintained 
friendly relations with the Cape Government.11  
The Commission hearing on 
Western Mpondoland
Chaired by Advocate D Ndengezi, the Commission 
sat at Libode on 17 August 2005.12 The initial 
presenter for the Western Mpondo was Bishop 
Joseph Kobo, not a royal, but seemingly respected 
as a learned man. As the hearing proceeded, 
members of the royal family became increasingly 
uncomfortable with the Bishop’s inability to respond 
adequately to the questions of the Commission. 
Kobo was followed by Prince Mlamli Ndamase, much 
younger, but much more fluent and determined.  
It soon became apparent that the commissioners 
really wanted to elucidate the conditions under 
which Ndamase established his authority west of 
the Mzimvubu River. According to the Western 
Mpondo claim, Ndamase was definitively established 
as an independent king by his father Faku. The 
Commission found it difficult to understand how two 
kingdoms could be created within the same family, 
more especially during the lifetime of the reigning 
king. Unfortunately for the Western Mpondo, they 
initially shied away from the somewhat shameful story 
(Faku’s being frightened at the sight of his own son) 
recorded by Victor Poto. They further embellished 
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Poto’s narrative by implying that Ndamase could 
have succeeded to the kingship of the whole 
Mpondoland, had he chosen to do so. The probing 
of the Commission exposed several such petty 
contradictions, causing the Western Mpondo to 
shift their ground more than once and putting the 
credibility of their argument in question. 
Bishop Kobo: When Ndamase arrived in this part 
of the area, he went back to report to his father 
King Faku, and Faku came over and anointed 
him as king. Faku was delighted that his son 
was so courageous to be able to subdue various 
tribes that lived in the area between Mzimvubu 
and Mthatha rivers. Ndamase voluntarily decided 
against contesting the kingship of his father at 
Qawukeni, though he would have had a legitimate 
claim. He decided against contesting allowing the 
next in line or his brother Mqikela to take over the 
kingship. At that time, Mqikela was nineteen years 
old. But Ndamase, because he was a warrior, he 
said to his father, I will go and establish my own 
kingdom. I will fight and fight and establish myself. 
I don’t want to interfere or worry my brother.  
Commissioner Ndou: Is that according to your 
culture for the father to install the son whilst he is 
still alive?
Bishop Kobo: It is not a custom that is followed 
[today] but on this particular occasion it was a new 
kingdom, not part of the kingdom of King Faku …
Commissioner Ndou: I just want to know whether 
the son and the father were on the same status, 
on the same kingdom?
Bishop Kobo: According to the tradition, Sir, 
it is always common knowledge that the father 
is always senior to the son. And I think that 
tradition and that custom have been observed 
throughout the history of the existence of the 
Nyandeni [i.e. Western Mpondo] Kingdom. There 
was never a time where the son or his kingdom 
would challenge the decision of the Qawukeni [i.e. 
Eastern Mpondo] Kingdom.
Commissioner Poswa-Lerotholi: Are you 
saying that Ndamase was the rightful … or had a 
legitimate claim to the kingship in that he was the 
first born, or are you saying that it was by some 
other means that he had a legitimate claim?
Bishop Kobo: I am saying, Sir Commissioner, that 
he could have had. He could have staged a claim 
to the kingship, because he was the eldest son 
and had the advantage over his younger brother 
because he was also a warrior … But he was 
aware of the fact that there is a younger brother, 
which was Mqikela, who is the legal one who 
should be succeeding his father Faku.13  
The good Bishop has been caught contradicting 
himself. The Commission pounces.
Commissioner Ndengezi: You say there was 
Mqikela who was still young, but was in fact 
according to custom going to be the king. How 
could Ndamase also have a legitimate claim? He 
could not have had a legitimate claim, if Mqikela 
was the lawful one to succeed. They could not 
both be legally qualified to succeed Faku, they 
could not.14 
The Bishop was in a corner and did not know how to 
get out of it.  He told a story about how Chief Poto 
complained to the Minister of Bantu Affairs, De Wet 
Nel, that his salary should match that of the Eastern 
Mpondo king, and that Nel responded by raising his 
salary. The Commission was not impressed.
Commissioner Ndengezi: De Wet and the then 
king are not really relevant. Tell us about the 
seniority.
Bishop Kobo: There is a Right Hand House and a 
senior house.
Commissioner Ndengezi: And here in 
Mpondoland, which is it? Which is a Great House, 
which is a Small House, which is a Right Hand 
House … ? So we want to know, don’t assume 
that we know. Tell us. That is what she wants 
(Commissioner Pungula), and we all want that.
Bishop Kobo: I think I have clarified that, that the 
senior house is Qawukeni. 
Commissioner Ndengezi: You did not. You did 
not, with due respect, explain it, Dada.15 
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The Western Mpondo argument was not accepted, 
and the Commission ruled unequivocally that there 
could be only one king in Mpondoland:16   
5.1.11 Having made a determination that the 
kingship of amaMpondo as a whole resorts under 
the lineage of Mqikela, the only other leadership 
positions available within the traditional institution 
of amaMpondo in terms of the Framework Act are 
senior traditional leadership and headmanship.  
If the Commission had simply ignored the Ndamase 
oral tradition and proceeded on the basis that the 
Western Mpondo kingship was nothing more than the 
payoff made to a colonial puppet for selling out Port 
St Johns, it would be difficult to fault its reasoning. 
This article falls short of endorsing the Western 
Mpondo claim to independent kingship, but it does, 
however, insist that the Commission was wrong to 
base its determination on the single argument that 
‘custom and tradition’ precluded the possibility of 
two kingdoms on Mpondo soil. The Commission 
also discarded the Rharhabe Xhosa claim on similar 
grounds, again applying its perception of customary 
law to historical events and again ruling out the 
possibility of two legitimate kingdoms emerging from 
the same royal lineage.
Transvaal Ndebele
The most important event in Transvaal Ndebele 
history, in the view of the Commission, took place 
some time between 1620 and 1680, in all probability 
before 1652, the year of the first Dutch settlement 
at the Cape.17 During the reign of King Musi, the 
third in line to the reputed founder of the Transvaal 
Ndebele kingdom, his junior son Ndzundza stole 
the succession from his senior brother Manala by 
underhand means.18  
The mother of Ndzundza said to him, ‘Get up early, 
because your father is dying, and he wants to 
hand over the chieftainship to Manala’. Then next 
morning Ndzundza was aroused by his mother, 
who told him to go to his father … his father 
said, ‘Who are you?’, he replied, ‘It is I, Manala.’  
Ndzundza deceived his father by having put on 
skins with the hair on the outside on his hands, 
since Manala was hairy on the hands, so his father 
thought it was he who touched him, because 
he was blind. He [Musi] said, ‘O, there, take the 
chieftainship here,’ and gave him the namxali [a 
kind of oracle, which only the king was entitled to 
consult].
Heard this before? The Commission was certainly 
not slow to recognise that this was a Transvaal 
Ndebele version of the Biblical story of Esau and 
Jacob (Genesis, Chapter 27). But the story does not 
end there. Manala was understandably furious and 
Ndzundza judged it wiser to decamp, not forgetting, 
however, to take the namxali with him. Three wars 
were fought between the two brothers before peace 
was made at the Bhaluli (Oliphant) River through 
the mediation of a wise man named Mnguni. It was 
resolved that (1) Manala was to rule west of Bhaluli 
and Ndzundza east of it; and that (2) in a conscious 
deviation from the normal exogamy rule, Manala 
could marry a wife from Ndzundza and Ndzundza 
could marry a wife from Manala. The issue of seniority 
remained something of a grey area. On the one hand, 
the story makes it clear that Manala was the rightful 
heir to Musi; on the other, the Ndzundza seem to 
have succeeded in holding on to the namxali.
By the 1830s, Manala and Ndzundza had sufficiently 
reconciled to combine their forces against the 
invasion of Mzilikazi, who took everything they had, 
including the name ‘Ndebele’.19 Sibindi of the Manala 
died in battle, while Magodongo of the Ndzundza 
suffered a lingering death on Mzilikazi’s orders, 
impaled on a stake for two days and two nights. 
The namxali disappeared, never to be seen again. 
Both kingdoms were destroyed, but the Ndzundza 
survived under their capable leader, Mabhoko:20  
The Ndzundza ... developed fortified mountain 
strongholds. By the 1860s, their capital, Erholweni, 
was probably the most impregnable single 
fastness in the eastern Transvaal. The security and 
the resources which the chiefdom offered attracted 
a steady stream of refugee communities to settle 
within its boundaries …
Conflicts flared with the Ndzundza refusing Boer 
demands for labour and denying their claims 
to ownership of the land … the Ndzundza also 
secured large numbers of guns … A number of 
Boer attempts to subdue the kingdom failed, and 
by the late 1860s many farmers who had settled 
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in the environs of the Ndzundza trekked away 
in despair. Those who remained recognized the 
authority of the Ndzundza rulers and paid tribute 
to them.
The Ndzundza kingdom survived longer than its Pedi 
neighbour, but by 1883 it had been defeated and 
Nyabela, Mabhoko’s successor, jailed in Pretoria for 
15 years. After the British victory over Paul Kruger’s 
republic, Nyabela attempted to return but was 
arrested, this time by the British, and told that he 
could never go home again.21 Unlike, for example, 
the Pedi or the Venda, the Ndebele were left without 
even the shred of a ‘native reserve’ and were forced 
into slave-like indenture on white farms. Nevertheless, 
despite their dispersion, the Ndzundza Ndebele 
clung to their historical culture, as exemplified in 
their distinctive beadwork and wall decorations. 
Matsitsi, Nyabela’s brother, managed to re-establish 
male initiation and its associated age-regiments. 
Informal headmen were recognised on every farm 
with a significant number of Ndebele households. 
These ‘headmen’ negotiated with the farmers, 
adjudicated internal disputes and referred difficult 
cases to the royal court. They met every year at the 
site of their 1883 defeat, to keep alive their hopes of 
restoring the ancient Ndzundza kingdom. Although 
entirely lacking in legal status or formal authority, the 
Ndzundza kingdom thus succeeded in surviving as 
a meaningful political entity throughout the first half 
of the 20th century, a truly remarkable achievement. 
The Manala, on the other hand, never recovered 
from their destruction by Mzilikazi, though remnants 
of the group maintained a precarious existence at 
Wallmansthal Mission.22  
As the Bantustan project took off, some Ndebele 
areas found themselves incorporated into Lebowa, 
others into Bophuthatswana. In July 1974 the 
Ndzundza Tribal Authority was excised from Lebowa 
and reconstituted as KwaNdebele. Three more Tribal 
Authorities (two Ndzundza plus the single Manala 
area) from Bophuthatswana were added in 1977. The 
question of the two paramountcies was problematic 
from the very earliest stages of this consolidation. 
The Manala faction, knowing its numerical weakness, 
initially evaded a vote, but a compromise was 
eventually reached by the KwaNdebele Traditional 
Authorities Act 1984 (Act 6 of 1984),23 which 
recognised four ‘tribes’ (three Ndzundza and one 
Manala), and two kings – one for Ndzundza and one 
for Manala.  
Independence, scheduled for December 1986, 
was approved by the KwaNdebele legislature but 
opposed by the Ndzundza Royal Family, allied with 
youth organisations and the United Democratic Front. 
More than 160 people were killed in the bloody civil 
war of mid-1986, which pitted the pro-government 
Mbokotho vigilantes against the Ndebele youth. In 
July 1985 the KwaNdebele government withdrew its 
recognition of the Mahlangu chiefship. Prince James 
Mahlangu was repeatedly detained, and the future 
Ndzundza King Mayitsha III was briefly imprisoned. 
Many leading Ndzundza royals went into hiding in 
Pretoria and the East Rand until, with the advent of 
the democratic transition, Mahlangu took over as 
Chief Minister in May 1990.
The role of the Manala family was, sadly, rather less 
glorious:24  
When the independence issue emerged in the 
early 1980s, members of the [KwaNdebele] 
cabinet promised to make the present Manala 
paramount – previously a taxi driver in Pretoria 
who had opened a number of businesses in 
KwaNdebele – supreme paramount of the Ndebele 
on the basis that the land where KwaNdebele was 
created was historically Manala land. In early 1986, 
Rhenosterkop, previously under the Ndzundza 
regional authority was handed over to the Manala 
tribal authority … the Manala paramount was both 
a businessman and an enthusiastic member of 
Mbokotho … 
The headman [of Rhenosterkop] was forced to 
sign papers agreeing to move to Manala under 
the ‘threat of a sjambok.’ Shortly thereafter the 
headman and his council were deposed … Young 
men were expected to join the Mbokotho and 
older men the Manala.  
Commission hearings on Ndebele
The first hearings of the Commission were held at 
KwaMhlanga in Mpumalanga Province, taking a full 
week from 17 June 2005. The Manala speakers were 
straightforward and smooth. They had a good case, 
and they made the most of it.
13SA Crime QuArterly No. 49 • SePtemBer 2014
Ndzundza took namxali, and when Manala 
discovered that, he chased after him, and 
caught him at Masongololo. All these things were 
happening while the old man [King] Musi was still 
alive … the old man said to Manala, go and catch 
up with Nzundza and bring him back here. Should 
he refuse, then you should kill him. It was difficult 
to do that, to kill him in actual fact … 
Here comes Manala, he is returning home 
to Ngwenyama [the King]. And Ndzundza is 
remaining there in Bhalule and even crossing the 
Olifants River. On his [Manala’s] arrival at home, the 
old man asked him, where is Ndzundza? Manala 
responded by saying that, by now I believe he has 
already crossed the Olifants River. You know the 
old man screamed out of surprise.
Now this is a question, according to the culture, is 
it possible that the king should rule whilst another 
king is still ruling? By the time when Ndzundza was 
crossing the Olifants River, the fact was that Musi 
was still alive. I am still repeating myself on the 
question that, is it possible that somebody else, 
whether Ngwenyama or Inkhosi, take over the 
reins to rule whilst another one is still alive, is that 
possible? History is telling us clearly that by the 
time Musi died, Ndzundza was no longer nearby 
by then. Which clearly means that the child who 
buried Ngwenyama, his father, was Manala ... 
Because they were the ones who remained in the 
royal kraal, in the headquarters. While Ndzundza 
proceeded with Ubukhosana or Ubukhosi on the 
other side of Bhalula.25
Thus, according to the Manala, there could be 
only one kingship (UbuNgwenyma). Ndzundza 
had departed with nothing more than chiefship 
(UbuKhosi).
It was a strong argument, which the Ndzundza did 
not even try to contest seriously. The Ndzundza 
king, Mayisha III, shrunken and congested, said very 
little and – a significant omen, this – died in his chair 
the very evening of the Commission’s departure. 
The Sokulumi, Litho and Pungutye branches 
of the Ndzundza had acquired their own lands 
independently of the senior Ndzundza line and were 
primarily concerned with maximising their autonomy.   
Even worse was the ghostly presence of Mahlangu, 
hero of the anti-independence struggle and pro-ANC 
Chief Minister of KwaNdebele during the transition to 
democracy. He had moved to Cape Town in 1994, 
under the impression that then President Nelson 
Mandela had promised him a seat in the national 
cabinet. Returning home disappointed and empty-
handed, he had visions calling on him to assume the 
Ndzundza kingship, despite his junior status within 
the Ndzundza royal house. His attempts to establish 
his own political party failed, and he attended the 
hearings in a state of visible emotional disturbance. 
Absorbed in their own troubles, the Ndzundza let 
their case go, almost by default.
The majority of the Commission had no qualms 
about embracing the Manala position in its entirety. 
Its determination for the Ndzundza – apart from the 
proper names – is identical to that for the Western 
Mpondo:26 
5.1.10 Having made a determination that the 
kingship of amaNdebele as a whole resorts 
under the lineage of Manala-Mbhongo, the only 
other available positions of leadership within the 
traditional institution of amaNdebele in terms of the 
Framework Act, are senior traditional leadership 
and headmanship. 
The Commission’s eventual determination on the 
Ndebele case is an excellent illustration of its line of 
approach, and is worth quoting at length:
10.3.9  The Commission finds that:-
a) It is improbable that Manala could have 
cowered upon catching up with Ndzundza 
at Balule River as claimed by the Ndzundza-
Mabhoko in that:
i) he pursued Ndzundza with the clear intention 
to take him back alive to Ingwemnyama Musi 
or kill him if he resisted.
ii) Ndzundza never returned home but settled 
across the Balula River.
iii) Manala had no kingship to surrender as 
Ingwenyma Musi was still alive. Therefore, 
Ndzundza could not receive ubuNgwenyama 
as it is common cause that a successor 
cannot reign while the incumbent is still alive.
inSTiTuTe for SeCuriTy STuDieS14
10.3.10  In accordance with customary law, 
kingship remained with Manala even 
during the colonial and apartheid eras 
although there was no official recognition 
of the institution of ubuNgwenyama …  
10.3.11 Officially, the institution of ubuNgwenyma 
for amaNdebele was created by section 
6 and recognized under section 7 of the 
KwaNdebele Authorities Act.
10.3.12 Whilst official recognition of the institution 
of ubuNgwenyma was laudable and in 
line with the historical and customary 
evidence presented, the creation of 
dual kingship was irregular. This was 
because it was not in line with the 
customary practice of the community of 
amaNdebele.
11.1 In conclusion, the Commission finds  
 that:-
11.1.1 The kingship of amaNdebele was 
established by Ndebele through 
conquest and subjugation.
11.1.2  Since Ndebele, the kingship has 
been passed on from one 
generation to another, according 
to the custom of amaNdebele.
11.1.3  At the split, Manala retained 
 kingship of amaNdebele as a 
whole.
11.1.4  In the circumstances, 
 amaNdebele kingship exists 
under the lineage of Manala.
11.1.5  In terms of customary law, and 
the Framework Act, Ndzundza-
Mabhoko paramount is not a 
kingship.
Both the Western Mpondo and Ndzundza Ndebele 
kingships thus fell by the wayside. But did the 
Commission really have any other alternative? To 
answer this question, we will need to return to the 
question of the Commission’s legal mandate and the 
reasons why it was established in the first place.          
The Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Act (41/2003)
For the purposes of this article, it is necessary to 
consider three salient aspects of this Act.
Mandate of the Commission
The preamble to the Framework Act identified 
its three main purposes, of which the third 
was especially relevant to the mandate of the 
Commission:
To restore the integrity and legitimacy of the 
institution of traditional leadership in line with 
customary law and practices.
The context of this imperative was clearly spelled 
out in the White Paper on Traditional Leadership and 
Governance, adopted by cabinet in June 2003 and 
which inter alia proposed the establishment of the 
Commission. Although in the South African context a 
White Paper is no more legally binding than any other 
document circulated for discussion purposes, reading 
the White Paper in conjunction with the Framework 
Act makes it clear that the latter is the former’s direct 
descendant.   
Section 5.10 of the White Paper highlighted the 
extent to which traditional leadership had been 
manipulated by the colonial and apartheid regimes:
[Colonial] legislation transferred powers to 
identify, appoint and/or recognise and depose 
traditional leaders from traditional institutions to 
the [colonial] government. In the process, the role 
of customary institutions in the application of the 
substantive customary rules and procedures ... 
were substantially reduced. In some instances, not 
only was [sic] illegitimate traditional leaders and 
authority structures appointed or established. But 
other legitimate traditional leaders were removed 
and legitimate authority structures disestablished.27 
The homeland system carried the same processes 
even further:
Homeland governments, too, passed their own 
laws that empowered them to ... appoint and/
or terminate services of traditional leaders, in 
some cases in a manner that did not comply 
with custom … In a number of cases, the courts 
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were also asked to pronounce on the legality of 
administrative acts as well as on the application 
of customary rules and procedures. They held 
that the statutory and subsequent administrative 
framework superseded customary processes. 
They took cognisance of customary processes 
only to the extent that the legislation concerned 
provided for the recognition thereof, if at all.28 
Let us flag, in passing, the strong contrast drawn 
by these paragraphs; between the oppressive 
administrative acts of illegitimate regimes on the one 
hand, and authentic customary procedures on the 
other. From this distinction, the White Paper correctly 
infers two categories of traditional leaders: illegitimate 
and legitimate. But who is to tell the difference?
There is a strong body of opinion, also supported 
by traditional leaders and traditional communities, 
that an independent mechanism should be 
established to deal with the legitimacy and/or 
illegitimacy of traditional leaders. Indeed, this is 
the correct approach. An independent national 
commission should be established within the 
national sphere of government to address this 
situation.28 
Thus was the Commission born. It did buy 
into this mandate, to cleanse the institution of 
traditional leadership of its apartheid accretions and 
deformities, and to endorse only those traditional 
leaders recognisable in terms of customary law. As 
Commissioner MA Moleleki explained at the Western 
Mpondoland hearing:
It is common knowledge that the institution 
over the years has been undermined. It has 
been eroded and distorted by among others 
colonialism, repressive laws. In particular, the 
Black Administration Act 38 of 1927, apartheid 
laws which provided for among others territorial 
authorities, self-governing states, and so-called 
independent homelands.
Evidently the dignity of the institution has been 
affected negatively. In order to restore the dignity of 
the institution, the State President of the Republic 
of South Africa appointed a Commission on 
Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims, and 
this is our official label.30    
The 1927 deadline   
The first mention of the year 1927 occurs in Clause 
25(2) (a) of the Framework Act:
The Commission has authority to investigate, either 
on request, or of its own accord – 
(vi) where good grounds exist, any other matters 
relevant to the matters listed in this paragraph, 
including the consideration of events that may 
have arisen before 1 September 1927.
The significance of this date is nowhere articulated 
in the legislation, but is made very clear in the White 
Paper: 
The European colonial expansion ... significantly 
altered the social organization of African societies 
and transformed them in a manner which made 
them amenable to European control. To this 
end, various statutes were introduced in South 
Africa. One of them, the South Africa Act of 1909, 
designated the Governor-General as the ‘Supreme 
Chief’, a position that gave him the power to 
create and divide ‘tribes’ and to appoint any 
person he chose as a chief or headman, and to 
depose such persons as he deemed fit. The Black 
Administration Act No. 38 of 1927 consolidated 
these powers and vested them in the Minister of 
Native Affairs. The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 
finally rendered traditional leaders part of the 
state’s bureaucratic machinery.31 
In its Section 5.10, where the establishment of the 
Commission is first proposed, the White Paper’s text 
reads as follows:
The commission may ... consider cases dating 
as far back as 1927. This is the year in which the 
Black Administration Act No. 38 of 1927 
was promulgated.
This is one of the very few points on which the 
wording of the Framework Act, already quoted, 
deviates from that of the White Paper, which gave 
birth to it. The White Paper clearly intended that 1 
September 1927, the date of the promulgation of the 
Black Administration Act, would be the cut-off point 
beyond which disputes and claims would not be 
entertained. The Framework Act, however, explicitly 
permitted the consideration of earlier events ‘where 
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good grounds exist’, thereby opened the door to the 
controversial decisions here under review.
Why was the Framework Act so revised? I can 
only speculate, but it is probably safe to say that 
the Framework Act never intended to deviate from 
the purposes expressed in the White Paper and 
articulated in its preamble, namely ‘to restore the 
integrity and legitimacy of the institution of traditional 
leadership’. The Native Administration Act was, as 
the White Paper pointed out, only a consolidation of 
prior colonial legislation, dating back to the South 
Africa Act of 1909, also quoted in the White Paper, 
or even to its direct predecessor, the Natal Ordinance 
3 of 1849. The Natal Ordinance first came up with 
the bright idea of declaring a colonial official (in this 
case, the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal) the ‘Supreme 
Chief’ of the colony’s African population ‘with full 
power to appoint and remove the subordinate 
chiefs, or other authorities among them’.32 However, 
the colonial authorities in the old Cape Colony had 
no such powers before the passage of the 1927 
Act. It was therefore necessary to allow for some 
degree of flexibility, though surely not to the extent 
of undermining the integrity and legitimacy that the 
Framework Act was intended to uphold.
Defining a kingdom
The Framework Act recognised three different levels 
of traditional leadership: kingship, senior traditional 
leadership and headmanship (Clause 8). For a 
kingship to be confirmed, it would be necessary 
to establish not only that the kingship was valid 
according to customary law, but also that the 
claimant in question was a king or queen rather than 
a senior traditional leader. The definition of kingship 
thus becomes of the utmost importance, and the 
Framework Act defines it thus:33 
(aa) that comprises the areas of jurisdiction of a 
substantial number of traditional leaders that 
fall under the authority of such king or queen
(bb) in terms of which the king or queen is regarded 
and recognised in terms of customary law and 
customs as a traditional leader of higher status 
than the senior traditional leaders referred to in 
subparagraph (aa); and
(cc) where the king or queen has a customary 
structure to represent the traditional councils 
and senior traditional leaders that fall under the 
authority of the king or queen
This seems very simple and straightforward – 
too simple and straightforward, in the view of 
Commissioner JC Bekker, who calculated that 
it could open the door to at least 773 kingship 
claims,34 but pertinent nonetheless. If these criteria 
had been applied, the Manala Ndebele should 
have been disqualified as a kingdom (having only 
one subordinate senior traditional leader), whereas 
the Rharhabe Xhosa (having a clearly defined 
area of jurisdiction with no fewer than 40 senior 
traditional leaders, every one of whom attended the 
Commission hearing to enthusiastically confirm their 
allegiance to the Rharhabe King) should not have 
been disqualified. The Commission, however, chose 
to come up with its own set of criteria, which – after 
several revisions – eventually looked like this:35 
6.2.1  In order to assume the position of a king 
or queen the person so identified must 
qualify in terms of the customary law of the 
traditional community.
6.2.2.  Once the position has been established, it 
becomes hereditary and is passed on from 
one generation to the next, according to 
customary law and the customs of the 
traditional community.
6.2.3  The king should rule over the entire 
traditional community with linguistic and 
cultural affinities rather than a section 
thereof.
6.2.4  There cannot be a multiplicity of kingships 
 emanating from one kingship.
The Commission does not quote any legal authority 
of any kind in support of this extraordinary set of 
criteria, nor – I suspect – is there any such to be 
found in all the many libraries of history, anthropology, 
politics or customary law. The Commission was 
established in terms of the Framework Act. It had no 
right to ignore the definition of kingship embedded in 
that selfsame Act and substitute something entirely 
unsubstantiated of its own devising.
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Most significant of all these criteria, and most far-
reaching in all its implications, is criterion 6.2.2, which 
not only casts the hereditary principle in stone but 
elevates it to a status whereby it overdetermines 
any other aspect of customary law. It is therefore 
important to point out that the selfsame hereditary 
principle is similarly echoed and invoked by the 
Commission in its rejection of the Western Mpondo 
and Ndzundza Ndebele claims.36 
7.2.4  Once the position has been established, it 
becomes hereditary and is passed on from 
one generation to the next, according to 
customary law and the customs of the 
traditional community.
7.2.5  The traditional leader may not establish 
or create a multiplicity of traditional 
leaderships equal in status to his. 
Customary law and customs of 
amaMpondo do not allow a multiplicity 
of traditional leaders emanating from one 
traditional leader.
Let us, for the sake of progress, ignore the fact 
that the Commission (not a traditional institution) 
in Clause 7.2.5 has arrogated to itself the right to 
determine what traditional leaders may or may not 
do. Let us ponder the implications of its deification 
of the hereditary principle in conjunction with its 
rejection of the 1927 deadline. Taking as our example 
the three Eastern Cape kingships confirmed by the 
Commission, we find the hereditary principle violated 
in each and every case: among the amaXhosa, when 
Tshawe replaced Cirha; among the abaThembu, 
when Dhlomo replaced Hlanga; and among the 
amaMpondo, when Gangata replaced Qiya.37 These 
events happened several centuries ago, but all these 
deposed factions have their descendants, and the 
logic of the Commission’s criteria should surely have 
obliged it to restore the kingly status quo as it had 
been in the Eastern Cape around the year 1650, that 
is before the arrival of Van Riebeeck.  
Moreover, in each of these three cases, the 
victorious faction justified its assumption of power 
in terms of the abuse of customary law by the 
deposed king. This is not the place to enter deeply 
into such questions but, as long ago as 1981, I 
had argued that the right to depose unjust rulers 
was an integral part of indigenous Xhosa political 
culture.  By subordinating all other aspects of 
traditional governance to the hereditary principle, the 
Commission entirely negates the more democratic 
dimensions of customary law and legitimates its 
despotic tendencies. 
History versus customary law?
Most of the claimants disappointed by the rulings of 
the Commission have challenged its determinations 
in court. At least one of its rulings has been 
overturned on the basis that the Commission’s 
proceedings were procedurally unfair,39 but, to 
the best of my knowledge, it is the practice of the 
Commission that is being challenged rather than the 
principles on which it operated. Moreover, because 
each case is handled on an individual basis, neither 
the inconsistencies in the Commission’s findings 
nor the fundamental flaws in its overall approach 
have been thoroughly grasped. In this concluding 
section I will attempt to critique the Commission’s 
shortcomings; firstly in the light of my own discipline 
of history, secondly in terms of the broader debate on 
customary law.
History by its very nature is a series of unique 
events, whereas law seeks to define and articulate 
the recurrent norms and usages by which any given 
society tries to function. Any attempt, therefore, to 
apply the consistencies of law to the inconsistencies 
of history is bound to fail. What would have 
happened, for example, if the Commission had 
applied its version of customary law to the well-
known case of the Zulu kingdom? Ignoring the 1927 
cut-off date, as it usually did, the Commission would 
have had no difficulty going back to 1840, some 
years before British colonial authority was imposed 
on the colony of Natal. That was the year in which 
Mpande fled his homeland to enlist the support of 
the Voortrekker leader, Andries Pretorius. In February 
1840, the Boers destroyed the army of Dingane 
and proclaimed Mpande King of the amaZulu. The 
Commission should have asked whether that was in 
accordance with Zulu customary law. 
By the criterion of customary law, all the descendants 
of Mpande onwards can only be seen as illegitimate, 
and the Commission is duty bound to replace 
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Zwelithini with a more legitimate incumbent. But 
who? Mpande’s predecessor, according to customary 
law, was his brother Dingane. But Dingane had 
murdered his own predecessor, Shaka, another clear 
contravention of Zulu custom.  Further research by 
the Commission would have revealed that Shaka 
himself had usurped the chiefship of his father 
Senzangakhona, leaving the Commission with no 
option but to identify the most senior descendant of 
Sigujana, Senzangakhona’s rightful heir, and to place 
him on the Zulu throne.
The Zulu case is presented as proof of the 
inapplicability of customary law to pre-colonial 
history by means of the ancient logical argument 
of reduction ad absurdum, defined by Webster’s 
dictionary as ‘proof of a proposition by showing 
the falsity of its contradictory opposite; also, 
disproof of a proposition by arguing from it to an 
impossible or false conclusion’.40 Let me spell this 
out: if customary law is applicable to the pre-colonial 
period, then the descendants of Mpande should be 
dethroned in favour of the descendants of Sigujana. 
By analogy with the logic applied in the cases of 
the Western Mpondo and the Ndzundza Ndebele 
discussed above, descendants of Mpande, such as 
King Goodwill Zwelithini, have no other leadership 
positions available to them in terms of the Framework 
Act than senior traditional leadership or headmanship. 
This is palpably absurd. Therefore customary law is 
not applicable to the pre-colonial period.  
This article, however, takes its stand not on 
theoretical logic but on historical grounds. No 
historical event of the pre-colonial period should be 
adjudicated by the criteria of the post-colonial period, 
because the circumstances of the pre-colonial period 
were so fundamentally different that the fundamental 
assumptions of the present simply do not apply. This 
is clearly illustrated by one of the dialogues from the 
Western Mpondo public hearing. It is worth quoting 
again:
Commissioner Lerotholi-Poswa: Are you 
suggesting that the Prince over there (indicating 
a young royal in the audience) could also do the 
same, and be legitimately placed by Queen Mother 
Bongolwethu elsewhere?
Bishop Kobo: Under the circumstances prevailing 
then, [it could be done] because there were places 
where the consolidation and management of 
tribal nations was not in place. But at this present 
moment, it wouldn’t be possible to do that. 
Because now everything is cut and dried, there are 
boundaries … At that time there were no declared 
boundaries. There was a process of invading and 
conquest to people trying to invade new territories 
to expand their empires. It is no longer the case 
now. The boundaries have already been declared 
of every tribe and nation. But when nations were 
born, they go forward invading, trying to gain as 
much territory as they can.41 
Although Kobo’s response refers directly to only 
one specific aspect of the pre-colonial context, 
namely the greater political fluidity contingent on 
greater territorial fluidity, similar considerations apply 
across the entire spectrum of social, political and 
economic life. During the pre-colonial era there were 
no constraints of land, water and natural resources 
to tie traditional communities down, no territorial 
boundaries to constrain political expansion and 
innovation, no overarching national state to set out 
norms and standards or to demand transformation 
in line with constitutional imperatives. There was no 
Framework Act Clause 8 to reduce the great diversity 
of traditional institutions into three categories only. 
And no Commission either.      
Does the case of the Nhlapo Commission hold any 
significance for the broader debate on customary 
law? In most respects, it must be admitted, the 
issues raised in this article are tangential to the 
more vigorous and significant battles that have been 
fought in the Constitutional Court with regard to the 
Communal Land Rights Act, the Traditional Courts 
Bill and other draft legislation, in which the customary 
arena has become a battleground on which chiefly 
elites and community interests contest power and 
resources.  
While the protagonists appearing before the Nhlapo 
Commission argued historical cases going back 
some hundreds of years with sincerity and passion, 
disinterested analysts might easily reduce the 
importance of these struggles to nothing more than 
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contests between rival factions for access to the 
status and power of the traditional elite.
However, the Nhlapo Commission, marginal though 
it may be to more significant national concerns, 
affords us a prism through which to view the dangers 
posed by the nebulous and solipsistic references 
to ‘customary norms and criteria’ that appear too 
often in the Framework Act. Although the mantra of 
‘custom’ is frequently invoked as a universal panacea 
to solve all problems and cure all ills, the experience 
of the Nhlapo Commission shows the extent to which 
it serves as a mask, or even a blunt instrument, 
to facilitate outcomes that are the very reverse of 
customary. 
However much it may owe its being to the ‘new 
South Africa’, the Commission’s understanding of 
custom has not proved itself demonstrably superior 
to that of Colonel John Maclean in 1858 or Professor 
AC Myburgh in 1985.42 Furthermore, as the above 
discussion on ‘criteria for kinship’ has shown, the 
Commission’s version of custom did not even derive 
from ‘official customary law’, but was blatantly 
contrived by the commissioners themselves. The 
flaws of the Commission thus highlight and magnify 
one of the most fundamental flaws of the Framework 
Act itself, namely its failure to grapple with, much less 
clarify, the meaning of custom within the context of a 
democratic dispensation. 
To comment on this article visit 
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